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Abstract—The digitization of the medical data has been a
sensitive topic. In modern times laws such as the HIPAA provide
some guidelines for electronic transactions in medical data to
prevent attacks and fraudulent usage of private information. In
our paper, we explore an architecture that uses hybrid computing
with decentralized key management and show how it is suitable in
preventing a special form of re-identification attack that we name
as the re-assembly attack. This architecture would be able to use
current infrastructure from mobile phones to server certificates
and cloud based decentralized storage models in an efficient way
to provide a reliable model for communication of medical data.
We encompass entities including patients, doctors, insurance
agents, emergency contacts, researchers, medical test laboratories
and technicians. This is a complete architecture that provides
patients with a good level of privacy, secure communication and
more direct control.
Keywords: privacy, medical data, architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Medical data is one of the most important data sets that
have ever been collected with regard to humans. There is a
need to share some of this data in lieu of supporting further
research. However, in the due process, if the medical records
are not being masked properly, then it might result in divulging
the private information of the patients. It must be noted that
although few patients are known to have been harmed by
security breaches of medical computers or devices, the security
of medical devices is not a luxury [14]. Malicious access
for various reasons such as insurance frauds could plague
the system. Thus, it is very important that the data stored at
these servers must be secured and shared carefully so that the
privacy of the patients does not get compromised.
Patients generally trust while interacting with the hospitals.
However, researchers can club with hospitals to get medical
records of the patients. We present an example to provide
the relevant background to the problem. Consider a scenario,
where a doctor who is a specialist in a particular medical
field and is seeing a large number of patients. Generally, the
doctors/hospitals maintain record of the patients. Researchers
are generally interested in the data records being maintained
by the doctors/hospitals as these researchers can perform data
mining operations on these medical records of the patients to
get some interesting results or insight which could be useful
for devising new tests or drugs. However, in the due process
the records of the patients become vulnerable to privacy
breaches. We agree that these data mining/research operations
are helpful in the field of medical science. However, at the
same time the privacy of the patients cannot be ignored. Thus
a system where a patient is the sole owner of his/her medical
records is the need of time. The incentive for the patient could
be monetary or in some cases better facilitation. For example,
the collection of such data is more common for new drugs
in the market and usually the provider of the drugs would be
more willing to see its effects for a price. Thus, we propose
an envisioned architecture through which patients remain the
owner of their data. In addition to this we also present a
mechanism by which researchers can gather medical records
of the patients after getting explicit consent of the patients.
The mechanism itself would not be transparent to the user
and it is completely envisioned to be automated similar to the
implementations of banking systems.
In the past researchers have proposed various mechanisms
(see section III for details) to counter various kind of privacy
attacks (see section II for details) on the medical data. Some
of the researchers have proposed new architectures such as [2]
and, [9] while others have proposed various data anonymizing
techniques such as [19], [12] and [21], for the medical records
before releasing the data for the research purpose. In contrast
to this, Gritzalis et. al. proposed new guidelines for the medical
field as a privacy solution [7].
To protect the privacy of the patients various laws and
acts have been formed such as Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in US, Data Protection Act
(DPA) in Europe Union and Personally Controlled Electronic
Health Records Act 2012 in Australia, to name a few. These
laws enforces that physician or the health providers take
proper procedures so that the privacy of the patients are
protected. In the next section (Preliminaries, see section II),
we describe various kinds of attacks which are possible to
breach the privacy of the data. We next describe a special kind
of attack called re-assembly attack, which is a special kind
of re-identification attack. The paper proposes an envisioned
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architecture for the protection of medical records from re-
assemble attack.
A. Re-assembly attack
Re-assemble attack occurs in a scenario where various
entities collude to create rich information from the chunk of
information they contain. These entities try to combine their
respective information based on a common identifier such as
the Social Security Number (SSN). The information being
created can reveal some private information such as location,
age or sex about the patient. We describe the re-assemble
attack with the help of Figure 1, which could be a source of
privacy leaks. A patient P1 might have to interact with various
entities like lab personal (let’s call it E1), nursing personal
(let’s call it E2), etc. During these interactions a patient might
have to divulge some personal information (lets call it D11,
D12, etc) during medical tests or day to day routine to these
respective entities. It might happen that these entities might
collude among themselves to create more information about
a patient. The new information D′1={ D11, D12, D13 } as
a result of collusion of various interacting entities might be
proper subset ofD1. However, the chances are thatD′1 is richer
and has more information than the individual information of
the interacting entities. The new information D′1 might be
subject of interest to researchers or attackers. In this paper, we
have presented a mechanism to defeat the reassemble attack.
Fig. 1. Reassemble Attack.
The major contributions of the proposed mechanism in this
paper are:
1) We identify a special kind of re-identification attack,
which we term as re-assembly attack.
2) To defeat the re-assembly attack, we present a decentral-
ized architecture which provides full ownership of the
medical records to the patients. Hence presents a privacy
cover to the patients. We also provide a mechanism by
which medical record of the patients can be shared with
the researchers anonymously and without affecting the
privacy of the patients.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents a collection of terms to be used in this paper. In
section III, we present relevant related works. We present
our envisioned architecture including various concepts and
algorithm in section IV. We draw our conclusions and outline
our ongoing and planned extensions of DAPriv in Section V .
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we provide brief definitions of various
glossary of terms being related and are used in this paper.
The least information flow principle can be defined as,
“whenever a patient is requested to provide specific personal
and/or medical information, she/he runs into the danger of
revealing much more information than it is really necessary
for the specific task she/he is trying to complete [7].
Centralized computing can be defined as computing done
at a central location, using terminals that are attached to a
central computer [3].
Decentralized computing can be defined as the allocation
of resources, both hardware and software, to each individual
workstation, or office location [4], [18].
Hybrid computing model works as follows. In a hybrid
model, a server is approached first to obtain meta-information,
such as the identity of the peer on which some information
is stored, or to verify security credentials. From then on, the
P2P communication is performed [15].
Interacting entities are those which share information with
each other thereby enhancing each other’s knowledge.
Quasi-identifiers refers to sets of attributes (like gender,
date of birth, and zip code) that can be linked with external
data to uniquely identify individuals in the population [12].
De-identification or Sanitization is the process by which
a collection of data is stripped of information which would
allow the identification of the source of the data [5], [12].
Re-identification attacks is the process of identifying the
source of the data [a.k.a the patient] from documents that have
been de-identified [6], [19], [1].
Homogeneity attack is a specific case of re-identification
attack where the patient is deduced due to insufficient diversity
in the data pool [12], [6].
Background Knowledge attack is a specific case of re-
identification attack where the patient is deduced due to some
information about the patient and medical condition provided
[12], [6].
Linking attack is a specific case of re-identification attack
which refers to a chain of linkages between different available
data in various databases to construct a more complete dataset
thereby resulting in re-identification [12]. In the linking attack
the databases are publicly available. However, there is no
publicly available common identifier to link these databases.
In contrast to this, in the re-assembly attack, the data is
not publicly available. However, the common identifier is
publicly available. In other words, various colluding entities
try to combine their data with the help of publicly available
identifier.
Forgery attack is an attack where one party acts as
an authenticated information provider thereby corrupting the
database and also in certain cases having successful hacks [22].
Man-in-the-Middle attack in cryptography and computer
security is a form of active eavesdropping in which the attacker
makes independent connections with the victims and relays
messages between them, making them believe that they are
talking directly to each other over a private connection, when
in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker
[16].
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section describes several interesting research done in
the past related to the privacy of the medical records.
A. New guidelines:
Gritzalis et. al. [7] present various risks involved with
medical data sharing and provide technical guidelines for
various protection measures by presenting guidelines that
apply privacy-related legislation in a coherent and coordinated
way. The work is very useful in understanding the various risks
involved and for proper risk management. The paper address
the factors of risk with a real-life example with credible
supporting data. This is hence important to understand when
creating new implementations. However, the scope of the work
is limited to providing guidelines to various stakeholders to
implement privacy and data protection mechanisms in medical
environments.
B. Privacy in medical devices:
Although, in the proposed work we have not taken care of
privacy leaks because of medical devices (it is a part of our
future work), the medical devices being used by patients can
also be a source of privacy leak. Furthermore, these devices
poses a new threat since these are susceptible to common
types of computer-security breaches such as those caused
by computer viruses, internet hackers, and the loss or theft
of devices containing sensitive data. Maisel and Kohno [14]
present a case for the security and privacy of one specific
use-case, namely the implantable medical devices. The authors
have brought into light the various issues that arise in the field
of medical devices and the possibilities of targeted attacks.
However, the authors have not provided a model framework
to support their arguments. Such a model would have had more
weight in completing the paper. On similar lines Maglogiannis
et. al. [13] also present a mechanism (which they call “mist”)
for one specific use-case namely, to protect location data in
patient telemonitoring systems (PTS) from issues pertaining
to privacy. The scope of the work is limited to formulating a
mechanism to pass location data from PTS while maintaining
both privacy and complete functionality to address emergency
situations. The work done is very useful in understanding how
distributing components helps in privacy. It presents a very
convincing case for location protection.
C. Privacy preserving using data anonymization techniques:
There has also been significant work done in the prevention
of re-identification attacks by anonymizing the medical data.
Data might be released as long as sufficient metrics for re-
identification are not met. K-anonymity is a seminal work by
Sweeney [19] in the privacy model for information disclosure
which can be used for anonymizing the medical records.
An information disclosure provides k-anonymity protection if
information for each person contained cannot be distinguished
from at-least k-1 individuals. If the database is large enough,
and there are enough candidates with shared attributes, then
linking becomes more ambiguous. Thus, this model scales
better with more data. However, it imposes a huge overload
on the system since the system has to maintain the quasi-
identifiers. Further, determining k isn’t easy though a suitable
mechanism has been provided. If k is too low, insufficient
ambiguity results and if too high, functionality is affected.
Also, K-anonymity is susceptible to homogeneity and back-
ground knowledge attacks. Machanavajjhala et. al. [12] present
another landmark paper in which they study the concept of l-
diversity which presents functionalities not addressed by the
k-anonymity model. L-diversity estimates characteristics of
data and therefore provides better anonymity. L denotes that
entropy of the data [log(l)] satisfies l-diversity. If some specific
data from the data pool is deemed insensitive for disclosure,
they are not taken into the entropy estimation. However, the
model works only if the initial entropy conditions are met.
Wang et. al. [21] propose a methodology for information
disclosure using a model of granular computing. The method
involves changing the data into a granular form such that
each granule contains data that cannot be used to compromise
privacy. The model provides a methodology to satisfy the
least information flow principle. Each granule is privacy aware
and addresses the vital points to privacy. The research calls
for some improvements especially in the practicality of the
proposed solution. The data anonymization techniques do not
take re-assembly attack into account, unlike our proposal. Our
architecture ensures that explicit consent of the patient is taken
for collecting medical records and for selection of specific data
anonymization techniques before data is released.
D. Architecture based approaches:
Some of the researchers have introduced architecture based
solutions to tackle the menace of privacy leaks in medical data.
The architectures to avoid various attacks can be categorized
in following three ways:
Centralized model: In [11], authors propose a central-
ized cryptographic key management framework for Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) pri-
vacy/security regulations. Patient’s data is stored in smart
cards. The scope of the work is limited to formulating a
centralized key management framework. Only the patient with
the valid access control and biometrics can retrieve the key.
The authors do not give any reason for having a centralized key
management solution. The key is obtained by access control
mechanisms, which might make it vulnerable. The work is
not conclusive and makes statements based on the HIPAA
framework.
Hybrid solutions: Boyd et. al. [2] introduces a new entity
in their proposed hybrid system which they term as ”Honest
Broker” (HB) to help in sharing the medical data with research
systems. HB would remove sensitive fields such as name
before passing them to research systems and refrain from
passing research data to systems that contain clinical records.
There is a minimal impact on the overall system if individual
nodes were compromised. The HB vets data passed to all
nodes. However, this presents a ”Single point of failure” by
centralizing majority of the flow to the honest broker.
Decentralized model: He et. al. [9] describe a decentralized
trust model in Medical sensor network (MSN) communication.
The model can be useful in advancing privacy in the commu-
nication. A model of trust recommendations by sensor nodes is
framed to prevent the bad-mouthing attack. Trust recommen-
dation is treated separately and only good recommendations
are used in the indirect trust model (trust propagation) for
communication between two nodes that have not done so
before. A total decentralized mechanism for privacy preserving
was presented in [22]. The authors proposed a smart card
enabled privacy preserving e-prescription system. The patient
would be able to carry the data using a smart card as a storage
mechanism. The device would provide data as required to
provide least required information at every given point. All
the data is digitally signed to preserve the integrity of the
data. However, the paper doesn’t address how the data would
be communicated to the third parties if the card resides with
the user.
IV. DAPRIV
In this section, we enumerate various relevant concepts and
describe our proposed architecture for preserving the privacy
of medical data.
A. Entities
In any medical system, there are multiple stakeholders. In
this section, we list the various stakeholders in the medical
system/environment who interact with patients.
Patient: Any person with a medical record is deemed a
patient. In our example, we show an active patient who is
seeking medical advise from a physician.
Physician: A physician is an entity who provides infor-
mation such as medical information and prescriptions to the
patient. A physician is bound by the patient-doctor confiden-
tiality and can be trusted with information. A physician could
fall under one of the two categories below.
1) Personal Physician: Each patient may have a designated
personal physician who advises the patient on their
medical condition. The personal physician can advice
the patient to take up some medical tests, or to consult a
specialist physician (termed as remote physician hence-
forth) or to get admitted in the hospital for specialized
treatment. We assumed entities such as nursing staff
merely represents the doctors and are bound by the same
laws.
2) Remote Physicians: These physicians are consulting
physicians or specialists. These also include the physi-
cians a person might consult during its travel. A re-
mote physician is the one who is not the permanent
personal/family physician of the patient. This class of
physicians may not be provided with all of the data. For
example, an ENT specialist may not be provided with
the data regarding the patients’ psychology.
Test Laboratories: Patients might have to take some med-
ical tests. The lab might have to report the test results to the
patients or in some cases to the doctors directly. The results
will then be interpreted by the doctors.
Insurance Agent: Users/ patients are generally being cov-
ered by insurance. Most of the time these insurance companies
require some parts if the medical data to process the payment.
In the model, we have not considered this entity as we
assumed because of governmental laws insurance agents will
not disclose patients data with researchers [10].
Researchers: Researchers are the entities who try to do
various research operations (for example data mining) to get
some insights from medical records. The term researchers
could represents an organization or a person. However, we
will use the term interchangeably in context of an organization
and a person. The researchers may send out invitations only to
doctors who in turn may choose to forward such invitations.
The researchers are listed in dictionaries and can also be found
directly by the patients through advertisements etc.
B. Architecture
In the introduction, we described how the different entities
could collude and perform a re-assembly attack. The attack
can expose the sensitive information about the patients. This
forms the primary reason for proposing our architecture which
is a patient oriented architecture. The onus of data disclosure is
on the patient. There can be no release of information about
the patient without the explicit consent. Further, we include
another step of anonymization to include the works of other
researchers in privacy such as k-anonymity [19] and l-diversity
[12].
1) Certifying Authority : Certifying authority is an au-
thority which provides public and private keys to various
entities in the system. We assume each entity (for example
patients, physicians, and lab personnel) have a public and as
well as private key. Certifying authority issues these keys to
various entities. These keys are integral part of the system
which makes sure that the system is privacy proof. They are
used typically as signatures and to verify the validity of the
source/destination.
2) Anonymizers/Sanitizers : This is the entity which en-
forces the process of anonymizing or sanitizing the data. The
patient themselves pre-anonymize the data by removing fields
they do not wish to share and sharing only data they wish
to. This entity further sanitizes data based on the submission
pool. This is done so that the patient may have a better
possibility of privacy. The anonymizers are also de-centralized
and thus help in enforcing the model. The patient also has the
option of not trusting any of the anonymizers and directly
submitting all the data. Similarly, the patient can engage the
services of an authorization server to have a more anonymous
communication with the anonymizer as well.
3) Directory Server : These servers act as databases which
lists all the laboratories and researchers. When a patient
approaches a laboratory for the tests, the lab provides its
identification of the form DirectoryID#LabID. The patient
sends this value to the authorization sever which verifies
laboratorie(s) through Directory server.
4) Authorization Server : Authorization server maintain
lists of directory servers. Each directory server is stored with
a unique ID. Further, these servers act as a bridge between
entities wherever needed. Unlike a tunnel based bridge such as
tor [20], the authorization server also helps to perform certain
key operations. However, as a possibility, the patient may
themselves implement the authorization server mechanism and
use tor-like tunnels for anonymity of communication.
5) Emergency contact : The contact which will access the
patient’s data in case of emergency for example when the
patient is in deep comma or is on run.
6) Emergency Contact Storage Server : This server stores
the data of the patients however this can only be accessed
by patient’s emergency contact. The emergency contact server
contains the public key of the emergency contact. All the
patient data (this does not include data about the various
patient keys) are then encrypted and added to the server.
The emergency contact may never access the data on the
server without triggering a signal to the patient. The signal
is triggered in the form of a standard flag and log mechanism.
7) Data tampering by the patients : A patient oriented
architecture, with all data controlled by the patient, reduces
the security and reliability of data for other organizations such
as insurance agents. To avoid tampering of the records by
patients themselves, any important entity providing data of
significance must always digitally sign the data. For example,
the digital signature can be used by the doctors to validate the
prescription given to a patient.
8) Encrypting the patient’s data : Data needs to be pro-
vided back to the patient. The public key is provided to the in-
teracting entity. For example, in the instance of lab test results,
the lab personnel write the data that has been encrypted with
the patient’s public key, back to the temporary communication
storage location. The private keys of the patient are not shared
with any other entity / person. They remain private. The patient
has a set of private keys and each private key has a few public
keys. At every use of a key, a decay rate for the public and
private keys are calculated. This is because of two reasons.
1) Using the same public key would identify the patient to
be unique
2) Using multiple public keys for the same private key
increases the probability of detection of the private key
If the threshold is reached for a public key, the respective
public key is archived and another public key for the private
key is created. If the threshold is reached for a private
key, all its public keys are archived and a new private key
with a set of public keys is created. To increase complexity
and randomness, the patient has multiple private keys, each
with multiple public keys. This framework of private keys
with multiple subkeys can be accomplish with most common
algorithms such as RSA [17] or Elliptic Curve [8]. At any
given request, a public key is selected at random from all the
available sets. Similarly when the patient passes the data to
the physician, they are encrypted with the physician’s public
key.
The mechanism itself however is completely automated and
the patient does not have to worry about the complexities of
the process analogous to general implementations of banking
systems.
9) How to avoid Re-assembly attack: : A patient divulges
a certain set of information at every lab test and at every
point where he/she communicates with a lab personal. Various
interacting entities can collude with researchers to get more
information about patients. An identifier such as SSN can be
used to locate various records of a patient scattered across
with various interacting entities. This is named as re-assembly
attack, which we classify as a special kind of re-identification
attack.
To tackle the re-assembly attack we propose the following
architecture (see Figure 2). The primary solution is our key
management mechanism. A patient can use multiple keys
while interacting with various entities. Even if various entities
collude they will not be able to identify which record belongs
to which patient. With the help of an architectural diagram
(see Figure 2) we next explain the process to defeat the re-
assembly attack in detail.
The edges represent the relation between two entities.
Furthermore, in following listing with the help of edge’s labels
(#Edge Number) we explain the process how the architecture
can be used for the deterrent of re-assembly attack.
• #1: The doctor passes the prescription (Pres), signed by
his digital signature to the patient.
• #2: Patient selects a lab for undergoing the tests. The Pa-
tient asks the AuthServer to authorize the tests prescribed
by the doctor at a lab using the Lab ID.
• #3: The AuthServer contacts Directory Servers to verify
if the lab can perform these tests.
• #4: Directorty Servers confirms about the Lab’s testing
capabilities (verification) back to AuthServer.
• #5: The temp communication store location is created by
AuthSever.
• #6: The location is given to the patient with an identifier.
• #7: In parallel, the location is given to the lab with the
same identifier.
• #8: Patient stores its Public key at temp store location.
• #9: Patient approaches the lab with the location identifier
and undergoes test(s).
• #10: Lab gets the patient’s public key (PPb) from the
temp store location. The usage of the patient’s public key
is describe next.
• #11: Lab stores the result (Res) of the Patient’s medical
test (encrypted with a symmetric key (SK) at new location
(Loc). This information is further encrypted with the
public key of the patient (PPb). For verification, lab
signed the result file with its digital signature (LPv).
• #12: Lab stores the information about the result and new
Fig. 2. Patient Lab Interaction.
location at temp store location. At temp store location,
the lab stores the (i) location (loc) where the actual result
file is stored and (ii) the symmetric key (SK) to open the
file. This information is stored using the public key of the
patient (PPb). The lab uses its digital signature (LPv) to
store this information. Lab also notifies the patient about
the placement of the result at new location.
• #13: Once the patient is notified about the test results,
it goes to the temp store location to fetch the location
where the actual test file is stored. Patient uses his/her
private key to decrypt the information.
• #14: Patient can then deliver then notifies the doctor (D)
about the result. It passes the location (loc) where the
actual result is stored and as well as the symmetric key
to open the file. This information is passed to doctor using
the public key of the doctor (DPb).
• #15: Doctor fetches the result file from the information
provided to it by the patient.
10) Gathering of medical records for research: : Our pro-
posed architecture provides a mechanism for the privacy leaks
however, we do understand for the medical research often
medical records in turn can benefit the patients themselves.
In Figure 3, we present the process by which researchers can
requests patients through their personal doctors. With the help
of figure 3 and following steps we describe the process by
which medical data can be gathered by researchers.
• #1: Researcher requests the doctors for the medical
records.
• #2: Doctor/Physician forwards the request to the patients
with the researcher’s identifier.
• #3: Patient contacts the AuthServer for verification of the
researcher.
• #4: AuthServer further contact the directory server(s) for
verification of the researcher.
• #5: After verification, AuthServer creates a temp store
location.
• #6: Also, AuthServer requests Anonymizer for creating a
anonymizer channel.
• #7: AuthServer updates the patient with the public key
of the Anonymizer.
• #8: Patient sanitizes the data, that is, removes the fields
which it does not want to divulge. It then encrypt the data
using the public key of the anonymizer.
• #9: Anonymizer decrypts the data and apply data
anonymizing techniques on the set of data it has collected.
• #10: Anonymizer then forwards the data to researcher.
In a decentralized architecture it is very difficult to compro-
mise all the entities (Authorization server, doctors etc) at the
same time as compared to centralized architecture [2]. Thus,
by distributing the responsibilities and assigning different roles
to different entities, the architecture helps in the protection of
the privacy of the patients.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Medical records of the patients are a valuable asset for
performing the research. Equally important is the privacy of
the patients whose medical records are investigated for the
research. Even if the patient’s data is secure with its personal
doctors, the medical data of the patient can be recovered
Fig. 3. Gathering of data by Researcher.
through various entities dealing with patients. We term this
attack as re-assembly attack where various entities can collude
to get more information about the medical history/data of the
patients. In the due process this can have an impact on the
privacy of the patients. We present a mechanism by which the
re-assembly attack can be avoided. We argue that to protect
the privacy of the medical records the patients should be given
full ownership and control of their data. Patients can decide
themselves what fields to expose to the researchers. To achieve
this goal, we presented a privacy preserving, patient oriented
architecture. The architecture forces the researchers to take
consent of the patients (through their personal doctors) before
they can obtain the desired data.
The privacy of the medical records can be achieved with the
combined efforts of proper laws and technical solutions. The
proposed architecture takes care of the present medical laws
and procedures in various countries and thus the architecture
assumes personal doctors and insurance agents will not share
the medical records of their patients. However, we accept
that more robust improvements are required to defeat the
privacy problems of the medical records. One approach could
be to provide the sole ownership of the medical records to
the patients themselves. To achieve this we need a complete
decentralized architecture on the lines of [18] where patients
store their data on their systems. This is analogous to the
concept of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) as proposed in
[22]. The patients can carry the smart device themselves and
can give temporal access to the interacting medical entities.
However, this idea might not be feasible for various reasons.
For example, non-privileged patients or for situations like
emergency. The solution for these scenarios could be repli-
cation of data from the patient’s device and the introduction
of emergency contacts.
Nonetheless, our architecture can further be improved in
following ways:
1) In the present architecture a patient can send someone
else to the labs to undergo tests. To avoid impersonation
by the patient a proper check should be in place.
2) Also the architecture needs to extend to cover insurance
agents as well.
3) Currently we have not put alarms in case an entity is
compromised. Proper secure alarms are need to be put
so that entities can be updated in case a particular entity
gets compromised.
4) An extension of the present work also plans to cover the
solution for the privacy breach because of the medical
devices.
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